What are the prospects for economic development in lagging sub-national regions? What are the roles of public infrastructure investments and fiscal incentives in influencing the location and performance of industrial activity? To examine these questions, we estimate a spatial profit function for industrial activity in Brazil that explicitly incorporates infrastructure improvements and fiscal incentives in the cost structure of individual firms. We use firm level data from the 2001 annual industrial survey along with regional data at the microregion level and find that there are considerable cost savings from being located in areas with relatively lower transport costs to reach large markets. In comparison, fiscal incentives have modest effects in terms of influencing firm level costs. Although the results suggest that firms benefit from being in locations with good access to markets, we do not suggest that improving interregional connectivity would necessarily assist lagging regions in the short run. Improving inter-regional connectivity implicitly reduces a natural tariff barrier so firms currently serving large markets and benefiting from economies of scale can more easily expand into new markets in competition with local producers. Therefore, producers in the leading regions can crowd out local producers, which would be detrimental for local production and employment in the lagging region.
In response to large and often sustained sub-national regional disparities in economic performance and living conditions, many national governments have adopted policies and programs to influence the geographic distribution of economic activity and, in the process, promote relatively balanced development across regions.
1 A wide range of instruments has been used to promote the growth of backward regions. These include subsidies to capital and labor, fiscal incentives, import controls, public expenditures in infrastructure and industrial activities, interventions in the location of public sector employment, and the development of secondary cities and growth centers. Some of these policy instruments are geographically targeted and others are topic or sector specific programs with differentiated spatial effects.
Although these instruments have been widely used to stimulate regional growth and development, very little systematic evidence exists that satisfactorily evaluates the effectiveness of these policies and programs.
The objective of this paper is to examine the roles of economic policies and regional characteristics in influencing the spatial distribution and performance of economic activity across Brazil. We employ two measures of economic policy in the analysis. First, we have compiled data on federal fiscal incentives and tax expenditures that are disaggregated by state and industrial sector. This metric will enable us to examine the extent to which firms respond to federal interventions aimed at influencing location of economic activity. The second variable indicates whether a municipio provides fiscal incentives to attract and sustain economic activity in the area.
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Brazil has a long history of regional disparities. The Brazilian Northeast has historically been the poorest region in the country, with per capita incomes about one-half those of the prosperous Southeast (Lall and Shalizi, 2003) . Per capita income differences 1 These interventions are motivated by regional equity as well as political concerns. 2 A municipio is a local jurisdiction most analogous in the U.S. to a county or its statistical equivalent because they are mutually exclusive and completely exhaust the country. In 2001, there are 5,507 municipios in Brazil.
across regions are relatively large and surprisingly stable over very long periods. Per capita income in the Southeast was 2.9 times that of the Northeast in 1939 and 2.8 times in 1992 (World Bank, 1998) . At a finer spatial scale, regional differences in per capita income are much more pronounced. For example, per capita income in São Paulo, the wealthiest southeastern state, is 7.2 times that of Piaui, the poorest northeastern state. Eight of the 10 poorest states in the country are in the Northeast and two are in the North region (Azzoni, Menezes-Filho, de Menezes, and Silveira-Neto, 2002) .
Beyond purely economic measures, social indicators in the Northeast region are also considerably worse than the national average. The illiteracy rate is at least three times higher than in São Paulo; child mortalities occur at twice the rate of the Southeast, 54.5 per thousand in the Northeast compared with 26.3 per 1000 in the Southeast; and life expectancy is four years shorter (Ferreira, 2003) . However, income inequality is much worse. The Theil Coefficient, a measure of inequality, is 0.80 for Ceará, Bahia and Pernambuco, contrasting sharply with a value of 0.55 for the state of São Paulo (Ferreira, 2000) . Fifty percent of the Northeast population lives in poverty.
Large regional disparities between the Northeast and the rest of the country coupled with a severe drought in 1958 stimulated the Brazilian government to develop explicit policies for the Northeast (Baer, 1995) . The evolving policies centered on a strategy to establish an autonomous center of manufacturing expansion by attracting "dynamic" and high-growth industries such as those in metallurgy, machinery, electrical equipment and paper products (World Bank, 1987) . Instruments including fiscal incentives, transfers, and direct expenditures to improve industrial land and infrastructure were widely used (Goldsmith and Wilson, 1991; Markusen, 1994; World Bank, 1987) .
Ferreria (2003) reviews various federal interventions designed to reduce regional disparities between the lagging Northeast (and the North) and the rest of the country. Former regional development agencies such as the Sudene and the Sudam used policy instruments including tax and investment credits, long-term financing, infrastructure construction (especially roads and energy), and income tax reductions for businesses in the region. 3 The total amount of regional and nonregional fiscal incentives for Northeast industry in 1980 has been estimated to be US$376 million, corresponding to approximately 2.5 percent of regional manufactured output (World Bank, 1987) .
When the Sudene and the Sudam were phased out in the early 1990s, they were replaced by a new set of instruments called the "Constitutional Funds." These investment funds collect 3 percent of income and industrial taxes and use it to finance investment in the North, Northeast and Center-West regions at subsidized interest rates. The total credit provided by the Constitutional Funds from their inception in 1990 to March 2002 is estimated to be more than US$10 billion (Ferreira 2003) .
Despite a long history of federal interventions to create a dynamic manufacturing industry base in the Northeast, evidence of any sustained structural change in the regional economy is lacking. In 2001, industrial activity remains concentrated in the Southeast region (see Figure 3) . Furthermore, Ferreria (2003) estimates that 57.8 percent of Brazil's GDP is produced in the Southeast, which comprises 43 percent of the population, in comparison with 13.1 percent for the Northeast, where 28 percent of the population resides. Despite some anecdotal evidence and a few evaluations suggesting regional convergence, it is difficult to attribute this trend to regional programs and policies. Furthermore, the main objective of regional policy for the Northeast, creation of a dynamic industrial base, does not appear to have materialized.
Our concept of regional characteristics extends beyond so-called natural advantages.
Rather than focusing on inherent characteristics such as climate and physical distance to the coast, we analyze the economic geography of the region, namely the quality of the transport network linking the location to market centers; the presence of a diverse supply of buyers and suppliers to facilitate inter-industry transfers; the potential for localized production benefits such as opportunities for labor market pooling; input-sharing; and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1890 (Marshall, , 1919 Chinitz, 1961; Jacobs, 1969) ; and amenities offered in the area.
Drawing on testable hypotheses from the new economic geography literature (see Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999) , this analysis provides the micro-foundations for understanding whether a region's economic geography influences location decisions for Brazilian firms. A general framework for evaluating the overall spatial distribution of economic activity and employment requires that we first quantify these basic geographic determinants of the firm's spatial profit equation. The basic premise for this analysis is that firms will produce goods in a particular location if profits exceed some critical level sought by entrepreneurs.
The main questions addressed in this paper are as follows: (a) How do explicit public interventions in the form of federal fiscal incentives, i.e., the "political economy," influence economic performance across sub-national regions? And (b) what effect does the "economic geography" have on the location and performance of manufacturing activity? Specifically, how do infrastructure quality and external economies associated with localization and urbanization enter into the manufacturing firm's spatial profit alternatives? We answer these questions using micro-level data from the 2001 Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA), which is collected and compiled by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We can obtain accurate micro-level estimates for medium and large-sized firms because the PIA is a census for enterprises with 30 or more workers. The IBGE also collects PIA data for a sample of enterprises that have less than 30 employees; however, a representative analysis of these small firms at the microregion level is not possible because the sampling weights apply only to each state. Therefore, we limit our analysis to firms that have 30 or more employees.
We classify firms into carefully defined industrial sectors and model their activities separately to control for heterogeneity in production processes and factor inputs across sectors. The categorization also permits identification of differential impacts from economic policies and regional geographic externalities that are industry-specific. We conduct the analysis at the three-digit level of the National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) and group firms into 12 manufacturing industries:
1. Non-durable manufacturing (food, beverages, and tobacco products) The enterprise data are supplemented by microregion-level economic data from the 2001 RAIS and transport cost data from Castro (2002) . 4 The PIA data enable us to identify each enterprise's location as a microregion, the spatial unit of analysis in this paper, and the four-digit CNAE code identifying its production activity.
Our analysis finds that improvement in transport infrastructure linking firms to large markets has the most important external impact on firm-level costs. In contrast, fiscal policies, measured as the level of tax expenditures at the state level, have produced mixed results on economic performance. Following this introduction, the remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 discusses the roles of external economies and fiscal incentives in influencing industry location and performance. In addition to providing an overview of the issues involved, we discuss how these factors play out in the Brazilian context. The empirical strategy is described in Section 3. Results from the empirical analyses are presented and discussed in Section 4. Some concluding comments and implications for policy and future work are provided in Section 5.
FACTORS INFLUENCING LOCATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRY
In this analysis, we are primarily interested in examining the contribution of infrastructure investments and fiscal incentives to the location and economic performance of industrial activity across Brazilian microregions. We first provide an overview of the various ways incentives and public expenditures on infrastructure have been used in attempts to influence spatial organization and performance of economic activity. We supplement this discussion by describing sources of external economies that may also influence firm level productivity or profitability. These sources include (a) own industry concentration (localization economies of labor-market pooling and industry-specific knowledge spillovers), (b) inter-industry linkages (proximity to intermediate inputs), and (c) regional diversity (urbanization economies).
Fiscal Incentives
Fiscal incentives have been widely used with the hope of attracting industries and stimulating growth in lagging regions. The rationale behind fiscal incentives is to offset the costs of firm location that may arise from transport and logistics costs, infrastructure conditions, factor price differentials, or a lower level of public services and amenities. In a survey of the literature in the academic, business and political press, Kieschnick (1981) identifies five reasons for the use of state level tax incentives to attract investment or Fiscal incentives are measured as the difference between a set of reference taxes and actual tax revenues that increases the resource availability for production units (firms). Details on the variable construction and summary tables are provided in Yepes, Lall, and Salvi (2004) . 
Public Expenditures on Infrastructure
Infrastructure investments have also been broadly attempted in regional development policies and programs. Examples of infrastructure-led development at the sub-national level include the development of secondary cities in Malaysia and Thailand, transportation capacity development in the lagging Brazilian Northeast, increased connectivity and accessibility to reduce geographical isolation of the northeast peninsula of Malaysia, and the transmigration programs in Indonesia, from the densely populated inner island to the less developed outer islands (Lall, 1996) , and in Nepal, from the interior mountain regions to the Terai plains. Studies examining the role of publicly supplied infrastructure in economic growth were revived by Aschauer's (1989) work on the United States and Biehl's (1986) paper on the European Community, which suggest infrastructure investments have important productivity and growth effects. Antecedent research on infrastructure and economic growth, however, dates back to the work of Hirschman (1958) on theories of unbalanced growth and other development theories regarding the role of "economic and social overhead capital" in national and regional development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurske, 1953; Nadiri, 1970) . Castro (2002) finds that the reduction in interregional transport costs was one of the major determinants of both the expansion of agricultural production to the central regions of
Brazil after the 1960s as well as increases in the country's agricultural productivity.
In this analysis, we use the equivalent paved road distance between each microregion and the state capital of São Paulo in 1995 to examine the impacts of transport costs on the profitability of industrial firms in Brazil. The intuition behind using this measure is that if transport costs and access to markets matter for firm level profitability, we should see lower production costs in areas with relatively lower equivalent paved road distances to São Paulo.
In other words, availability of interregional infrastructure linking firms (in peripheral regions) to large market areas should contribute to increase in profitability.
Other sources of external economies -Economic Geography

Own industry concentration
Localization, the co-location of firms in the same industry generates externalities that enhance productivity of firms in that industry. The benefits of localization include sharing of sector-specific inputs, skilled labor, and knowledge, intra-industry linkages, and opportunities for efficient subcontracting among firms . Firms that share specialized inputs and production technologies are more likely to cooperate in a variety of ways. Furthermore, a large concentration of firms within the same industry increases possibilities for collective action to lobby regulators, or to bulk bid prices of intermediate products and other factors of production. There is considerable empirical literature supporting the positive effects of localization economies (Henderson 1988, and Ciccone and Hall 1995) . In a recent study of Korean industry, Henderson, Lee, and Lee. (2001) estimate scale economies using city level industry data for 1983, 1989, and 1991-93 , and find localization economies of about 6 to 8 percent. This implies that a 1 percent increase in local own industry employment results in a 0.06-0.08 percent increase in plant output.
Although industry concentration provides many benefits, some of these may be offset by higher input costs from enhanced competition between firms for labor and land.
Coincident with higher productivity, wages and rents may rise and transport costs may increase due to congestion. Therefore, the net benefits of own industry concentration may be marginal for sectors with low skilled labor and standardized technologies. Localization economies require interaction between firms so a more appropriate measure should recognize the importance of the number of firms in addition to the number of workers in an industry because both these factors affect the scope and scale of interaction.
In this paper, we develop a measure of own industry concentration that adjusts industry employment in each region for the industry's local firm-size distribution. This measure ri ẽ is firm-size adjusted employment for industry i in region r, and is defined as: Thus, our measure ri ẽ penalizes regions where employment is concentrated in a few firms.
For the analysis, we calculate own industry concentration using employment and firm-size distribution statistics from 2001 RAIS data.
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Spatial Concentration of Brazilian Industry
We use the measure of own industry concentration ri ẽ to examine the spatial distribution of industrial activity across Brazilian microregions. activities, pointing to the fact that the growth pole has had very little impact on the region as a whole.
Inter-Industry Linkages
In addition to intra-industry externality effects, we also include a measure to evaluate the importance of inter-industry linkages in explaining firm-level profitability and thereby, location decisions. Marshall (1890 Marshall ( , 1919 first introduced the importance of inter-industry linkages as a major agglomerative force. Venables (1996) Several approaches for defining inter-industry linkages are available: input-output based, labor skill based, and technology flow based. Although these approaches represent different aspects of industry linkages and the structure of a regional economy, the most common approach employs a national level input-output account as a template for identifying strengths and weaknesses in regional buyer-supplier linkages (Feser and Bergman, 2000) .
The strong presence or lack of nationally identified buyer-supplier linkages at the local level can be a good indicator of the probability that a firm is located in that region. linkages is defined as
Backward Linkages
where L is a region by industry matrix of location quotients for selling sectors and Ω is a national direct requirements matrix of technical coefficients with purchasing industries as columns and supplying sectors as rows. Each column vector of Λ is a composite measure of the j th industry's backward linkages for regions r. Therefore, a firm in region r and industry j has a measure of backward linkages rj Λ .
For Ω , we use a 1996 matrix of national technical coefficients published by the IBGE. 7 Each element of L is a standard location quotient calculated as
where ri e is employment in region r and industry i.
7 Matrix of National Technical Coefficients, Matriz dos Coeficientes Técnios Intersetoriais, 1996, IBGE.
Economic Diversity
Inter-industry externalities may also arise from classic Chinitz-Jacobs' diversity (see the description in Lall, Koo and Chakravorty, 2003) , in addition to buyer-supplier linkages.
The diversity metric is a summary measure of urbanization economies that accrue across industrial sectors and benefit firms in the agglomeration without regard to specific industry. Chinitz (1961) and Jacobs (1969) proposed that important knowledge transfers primarily occur across industries and the diversity of the local industry mix is important for these external effects.
The benefits of locating in a large diverse area go beyond the technology spillovers argument. Firms in large cities have relatively better access to business services, such as banking, advertising, and legal services. Particularly important in the diversity argument is the heterogeneity of economic activity. On the consumption side, increasing the range of local goods that are available enhances the utility of consumers. At the same time, the output variety in the local economy can affect the level of output on the production side (AbdelRahman, 1988; Fujita, 1989; Rivera-Batiz, 1988) , that is, urban diversity can yield external scale economies through the variety of consumer and producer goods. Recent empirical studies by Bostic (1997) and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1993) show that diversity in economic activity has considerable bearing on the levels of regional economic growth. The later type of benefit is particularly important in developing countries where most manufacturing industries are based on low skills and low wages but an abundant local labor supply.
In this study, we use the industry-mix Herfindahl measure to examine the degree of economic diversity in each district. The Herfindahl index of a region r, H r , is the sum of squared industry shares of total employment in region r:
Unlike measures of specialization that focus on one industry, the diversity index considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for H r is one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Therefore, a higher value signifies less economic diversity. For a more intuitive interpretation of the measure, the diversity index in our model, H r , is subtracted from one so that DV r =1-H r and a higher value of DV r signifies that the regional economy is relatively more diversified.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The empirical strategy involves estimating a cost function that includes a mix of micro firm-level variables along with measures of economic policy, infrastructure, and the region's economic geography. Variables that are external to the firm's direct production process are included in the estimation as we hypothesize that these are likely to influence its costs and profits in the form of pecuniary and technological externalities. After developing the estimation methodology, we also provide a short description of the firm level data used in the analysis. The underlying analytic strategy is based on the "New Economic Geography" literature, in which Krugman (1991a Krugman ( , 1991b and Fujita et al. (1999) analytically model increasing returns stemming mostly from pecuniary externalities. These models emphasize the importance of supplier and demand linkages and transportation costs, whereas firms prefer to produce each product in a single location given fixed production costs. Firms also prefer to locate their production facilities near large markets, given transportation costs.
Thus, external economies and economic policy variables enter as additional variables in a cost function.
A similar estimation strategy has been employed in Lall, Koo, and Chakravorty (2003) and Lall, Shalizi, and Deichmann (2004) for estimating the impact of agglomeration economies using firm-level data for Indian industry, and in Feser (2002) for analysis of external economies enjoyed by U.S. manufacturing firms.
In this analysis, we employ a similar framework to estimate a spatial cost function and examine location and production choices in Brazilian industry. A traditional cost function for a firm i is (subscript i is dropped for simplicity):
where C is the total cost of production for firm i, Y is its total output, and w is an ndimensional vector of input prices. Fiscal incentives, infrastructure, external economies and other regional characteristics are also important in determining the firm's cost structure.
Costs for a firm are determined not only by its output and the pricing of its inputs, but also by ease of access to markets via reliable transportation networks, availability of a diverse input mix, localized externalities from similar firms in the region, and rebates in the form of fiscal incentives. Such location-specific advantages have clear implications for a firm's location decision because they create cost-saving externalities. We modify the basic cost function to include the influence of these external factors:
where C r is the total cost of a firm in microregion r, w r is an input price vector for the firm in microregion r, and A is a m-dimensional vector of external benefits at microregion r.
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The model includes four conventional inputs: capital, labor, energy, and materials (KLEM) so that the total cost is the sum of the four factor costs. We also incorporate five Shephard's lemma produces the optimal cost-minimizing factor demand function for input j corresponding to input prices as follows:
where X jr is the factor demand for j th input of a firm in microregion r. Clearly, the firm's factor demand is determined by its output, factor prices, and location specific external economies. Therefore, the production equilibrium is defined by a series of equations derived from equations (6) and (7).
The empirical implementation of the model above is based on a translog functional form, which is a second-order approximation of any general cost function. The translog specification provides considerable flexibility and imposes the fewest technical assumptions compared to other forms such as the Cobb-Douglas or the constant elasticity of substitution specifications (Christensen et al., 1973 From equation (7), the cost share of input factor j is
Notice that the cost share equations of all factor inputs satisfy the adding up criterion, Σ j S j =1.
The "adding up criterion" has important implications for model estimation. The system of cost share equations satisfies the "adding up criteria" if
thus reducing the number of free parameters to be estimated.
The translog cost function can be directly estimated from Equation (8); however, a joint estimation of Equations (8) and (9) with Restriction (10) significantly improves the efficiency of the model.
The impact of external factors on the cost structure, or profitability, of the firm can be evaluated by deriving the elasticity of costs with respect to the external economy variables.
From Equation (8) the cost elasticities are:
Firm Level Data
The translog specification of the production (cost) function requires an exogenous treatment of factor prices. Unfortunately, we lack exogenous pricing data for the four production factors included in the model. Therefore, we must rely on the "small player"
assumption that an individual firm is a price taker and cannot significantly influence a region's prevailing prices of capital, labor, energy, and materials (KLEM). In general, the region's prevailing price is defined as the average price of the factor for sampled firms in the microregion. The necessary condition of factor price-taking behavior among firms is preserved insofar individual firms do not contribute significantly to their regional means. To ensure some homogeneity among the factors to be priced, mean prices are conditional on the firm's 4-digit National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) code. The prevailing price of KLEM for each firm is simply the average unit costs of capital, labor, energy, or materials for firms in the region with common 4-digit industry classifications.
Capital. The prevailing price of capital in each region captures annual leasing rents for buildings and equipment paid by sampled firms in the microregion. By excluding asset acquisition, we assume that leasing and purchasing markets are competitive. Therefore, the fraction of the value of accumulated capital stock that factor into production during the single, surveyed year is equivalent to its leasing price. Although we avoid the potential arbitrariness of choosing a fixed amortization schedule for heterogeneous assets that depreciate at differing rates, the validity of our measure of capital rents rests on the reasonable assumption of competitive purchasing and leasing markets.
We define prevailing regional prices of capital as the average annual lease and rental payments per dollar of output for a region's firms in each 4-digit CNAE. Unit capital cost for each firm in the sample is obtained by dividing annual lease payments by output. The firm's price of capital is the mean unit capital cost for firms in the same industry.
Labor. The unit cost of labor is calculated by dividing the total wages and benefits paid by each firm to its workers employed in its industrial production by the average number of line workers for the year. The result is the average annual line wage for each firm in the sample.
The average annual line wage should capture the price of labor specific to each 4-digit CNAE better than total labor costs per worker because the former measure disregards some possible inefficiencies pertaining to management and other staffing indirectly involved in the firm's production. A region's prevailing wages are defined as mean average annual line wages for each industry. As there are differences in workers across industries with regard to skill and productivity, it is reasonable to expect that prevailing wages vary across industries.
Energy. To price energy, we include the firms' annual costs of fuel and electricity consumption. Unit energy costs are calculated for each firm by dividing total expenditures on fuel and electricity by the firm's total sales of the industrial products (output). The prevailing energy price for each industry in each microregion is the average of unit energy costs.
Materials. Data on the stock and flow of materials permit us to calculate the value of materials consumed during the production year. The value of materials consumed equals the value of the material stock at the end of the previous year plus purchases during the surveyed year minus the value of stock at the end of the production year. Unit material costs are the value of the firm's material consumption divided by its output. Prevailing industry prices for materials in each region are defined as the average unit material cost for the 4-digit sector.
The KLEM price measures provide reasonable assurance we are modeling factor price-taking behavior among firms in the PIA sample.
RESULTS FROM THE ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis is conducted by jointly estimating equations (8) and (9) as a system with equation (10) as a restriction. The estimation is conducted using an iterative seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR) procedure. The underlying system is nonlinear, and is primarily derived from the structure of the input demands, as represented in equation (7).
The ITSUR procedure estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for heteroscedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. As the cost shares sum to unity, n-1 share equations are estimated (where n is the number of production factors). The ITSUR estimates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates and are invariant to the omitted share equation (Greene, 2000) . All estimations were carried out with the MODEL procedure of the SAS system.
As there is considerable variation in the way that firms use technology, make factor allocation decisions, and can benefit from external economies, we estimate models by firm size categories in addition to industry wide estimates. For example, smaller firms may be more reliant on timely and cost efficient access to buyers and suppliers, availability of ancillary services, inter firm non-technological externalities, and high quality infrastructure.
In contrast, larger firms may be in a better position to internalize production of various intermediate goods, self-provide infrastructure, and stock higher inventories. Thus, they would be relatively less dependent on location based amenities and characteristics . To make allowances for this heterogeneity, and test if in fact there are differences in production costs and the impact of economic geography and policy instruments across firms of different sizes, we classify firms into two categories: medium, and large.
Medium sized are between 30 and 99 employees and large firms have 100 or more employees. The number of firms by size category, along with the average number of employees, unit costs, and output per worker is reported in Table 1 . As the PIA data is a census of all firms with more than 30 employees, the data include all industrial activities in the sector.
Fiscal Incentives
The first three columns of Table 2 provide the cost elasticities of fiscal incentives, with the industry-wide elasticities in the first column followed by elasticities for medium and largesized firms. The impacts (cost elasticities) of fiscal incentives are estimated using the specification equation (11). The last three columns of this table provide estimates of ϕ F (from equation 8), which tests if whether or not a municipio offers fiscal incentives matters in terms of reducing firm level costs. As in the case of the cost elasticities, industry-wide estimates are followed by estimates for medium and large sized firms.
Let us first consider how federal fiscal incentives offered at the State level influence firms level costs. The intuition behind using this variable is that if a firm is located in a State that offers incentives specific to its own industry, then there is a greater likelihood that the firm will use these incentives to offset production costs. Thus, higher incentives amounts would translate into lower production costs.
There is considerable variation in the impact of incentives across sectors and firm sizes. The industry-wide results show that fiscal incentives have a statistically significant cost reducing effect in four of the twelve study sectors. These are Non Durable manufacturing, Leather products, Rubber and Plastic, and Metals. For example, the cost elasticity in the Rubber and Plastic industry is -0.07, which means that doubling the availability of fiscal incentives will be associated with a 7% decrease in firm level costs. Similarly, the cost elasticity for Leather products is about -0.144 and for Non Durable Manufacturing is -0.026.
In contrast to these cost reducing effects, we get a rather counter-intuitive results for the Chemicals and Non Metallic Minerals sectors, where providing incentives increases firm level costs by 6.6% and 2.4% respectively.
Disaggregating the results by firm size, for medium sized firms we find that cost elasticities are negative and significant in four industry sectors, which are the same sectors as in the case of the industry-wide estimates. The estimated elasticities are also similar in terms of magnitude of the effects: -0.032 for Non Durable manufacturing, -0.122 for Leather, -0.064 for Rubber and Plastic, and -0.032 for Metals. For the Leather industry, this means that on average, doubling the amount of sector specific fiscal incentives available at the State level would be associated with a 12.2% reduction in firm level costs for medium sized firms.
In addition to these cost reductions, we also find cost increases associated with State level incentive provision in the Chemicals (9%) and Non Metallic Minerals industries (2%).
For large size firms, availability of fiscal incentives are associated with cost reductions in three industry sectors -Printing and Publishing, Rubber and Plastic, and Metals. For instance, the cost elasticity for Printing and Publishing is 0.065, which means that a doubling the level of State level fiscal incentives would be associated with a 6.5% reduction in cost for the average large firm in the sector. In contrast to the medium sized firms, there are no sectors that show statistically significant cost increases associated with fiscal incentives.
The last three columns of Table 2 provide parameter estimates for ϕ F (equation 8).
From these estimates, it is clear that the indicator variable of 'whether or not a municipio offers fiscal incentives' does not have any significant effect on firm level costs. The only exception appears to be for the (industry wide) Wood Products sector, where firms in municipios offering fiscal incentives have about 6.7% lower costs than other similar firms.
We must point out that the indicator variable is rather crude, and does not tell us anything about the sectoral distribution of incentives.
In general, the results reported in Table 2 show that the impacts of fiscal incentives are quite modest. For the most part, availability of fiscal incentives do not matter in terms of reducing firm level costs. In particular, sectors requiring considerable capital outlays such as Mechanical Machinery, Transportation Equipment, and Electrical and Electronics components do not respond to the availability of these incentives. This could be due to: (a) the size and composition of the incentive package is not sufficient to offset expenditures to produce in peripheral or lagging regions, or (b) most firms do not have access to these incentives even when these are available at the State level (i.e. discretionary incentives are targeted only to a few firms). More detailed analysis with firm level fiscal incentives data would be required to identify the exact reasons why fiscal incentives do not have a significant impact on cost reductions. When fiscal incentives are statistically significant, the estimated elasticities are quite small, which would suggest that the net benefits from fiscal incentives would be inadequate to enhance profitability or induce relocation to peripheral locations.
Transport Infrastructure
We provide the cost elasticities (calculated from equation 11) for transport costs in Table 3 . The first column provides industry-wide estimates followed by elasticities for medium and large sized firms. As described earlier in the paper, the transport cost variable measures the equivalent paved road distance from the microregion to São Paulo. We expect that firms that have lower equivalent paved road distances 9 to São Paulo (the largest market in the country) would incur lower costs as they can reduce transport costs to supply markets and satisfy demand. In addition to the pure pecuniary benefits from reducing transport costs, availability of good infrastructure linking firms to market centers increases the increases the potential for input diversity, increases probability of technology diffusion through interaction and knowledge spillovers between firms, as well as between firms and research centers.
Thus, improved accessibility (though lower transport costs) has the effect of reducing geographic barriers to interaction, which increases specialized labor supply and facilitates information exchange, technology diffusion and other beneficial spillovers that have a selfreinforcing effect (see McCann 1998 , for a detailed discussion on this issue).
Let us now look at the estimated elasticities for the transport variable reported in These results provide evidence to support the hypothesis that infrastructure improvements linking firm to market centers lead to considerable benefits at the firm level.
This is particularly the case in standardized manufacturing sectors, where improvements in interregional transport infrastructure that would reduce the "equivalent paved" distance to São Paulo improve proximity to markets and suppliers, and will be associated with cost reductions at the firm level. In comparison, many industries with significant process or product innovation components may be relatively less sensitive to transport costs compared to benefits from localization or urbanization (this is one explanation for why electrical and electronics manufacturing do not show net benefits from proximity to São Paulo).
Regional Characteristics
Summary results showing the impact of regional characteristics (economic geography) are reported in Table 4 . Estimates reported in Table 4 are cost elasticities, as defined in equation (11). As in the previous tables, we provide results for the industry in general, followed by specific parameter estimates for medium, and large firms. 
CONCLUSIONS
Many countries have large and sustained differences in sub-national living conditions and economic performance. Various policy instruments such as infrastructure improvements and fiscal incentives have been used to alter the national economic landscape and in the process encourage the growth of lagging sub national regions. However, it is unclear whether in most instances, these interventions have improved development outcomes of these regions. In this paper, we examine whether infrastructure improvements and fiscal incentives reduce firm level costs, thereby influencing firms to locate and produce in areas offering these benefits?
We also examine whether regional characteristics in the form of own industry concentration, spatially proximate inter-industry linkages, and regional economic diversity reduce costs for individual firms.
In general, we find that lower transport costs or improvement in access to markets are associated with reductions in firm level costs. This means that firms located in areas with relatively better market access (measured as the equivalent paved road distance to São Paulo) tend to have lower costs compared with similar firms in that industry. In comparison, the effects of fiscal incentives are quite small. In general, provision of state level (sector specific) fiscal incentives does not reduce firm level costs. This is particularly the case for sectors requiring considerable capital outlays, such as mechanical machinery, transportation equipment, and electrical and electronics. Even when the impacts of fiscal incentives are statistically significant, the estimated elasticities are small enough to suggest that they would be inadequate to enhance profitability or induce relocation to peripheral locations. There is considerable inter-industry variation in the impact of regional characteristics. However, localization and urbanization economies are relatively more important for industries that depend on local suppliers and demand, such as printing and publishing and transportation equipment.
What do these results mean for the development of lagging regions? Would the empirical estimates supporting cost reductions through interregional infrastructure improvements be the key for developing the lagging Northeast? Most probably not, and for the following reasons. As most of the study industries produce standardized products, consumers will purchase products based on price and possibly quality differentials. Further, existing firms located in agglomerations accrue scale economies from transport savings and the diversity of input supply. Inter-regional transport improvements that improve the Northeast's linkages with the rest of the country will implicitly reduce a natural tariff barrier.
Thus, firms serving larger markets (such as non-basic goods producers in the Southeast) and benefiting from economies of scale and lower unit costs of production can more easily expand into new markets in competition with local producers when the unit cost of distribution between two points is lowered. In the case where manufactured goods are standardized and product substitution is relatively costless, instead of manufacturing activity moving to or being created in the Northeast (we may however see a few firms move or start up) 10 , we are likely to see that producers in the leading regions (such as São Paulo) will expand production and crowd out local producers in the lagging region. 11 This may benefit local consumers in the short run but it will be detrimental for local production and employment. Thus, it is difficult to say whether transport improvements are likely to have much development impact on the Northeast.
So what should regional development policy look like? Let us first reiterate that competition in standardized products is unlikely to be the future for lagging regions, especially if production of these standardized products is already concentrated or agglomerated in the leading region, and these products exhibit some degree of increasing returns to scale. In this context, it may be worth thinking of industry sectors where the lagging region has comparative advantage -either due to location or (non oil/ mineral) local /regional endowments, or those that have not yet agglomerated in the leading region. In these cases, development of upstream and downstream industries along with inter-regional and local infrastructure improvements may create new markets and growth prospects. More research on barriers to local development (such as local infrastructure bottlenecks) and new product innovation opportunities is required to carefully comment on the viability of these strategies.
11 There are 'tipping points' for industry location in agglomerations when congestion costs and wages are high enough to offset net economies from agglomeration. However, these diseconomies are likely to decongest or de-concentrate in the form of spillover developments in areas that are well connected to buyers and suppliers. As figure 2 shows, even though there have been considerable nationwide transport improvements over the past 30-40 years, these have been relatively higher in areas near major market centers, such as Sao Paulo. Thus, connectivity through transport improvements is higher in areas that are also geographically close to the large markets. Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 1%, coefficients underlined are significant at 5%. 
